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Many advanced economies are heading into an era of fiscal stress: populations are aging and governments
have made substantially more promises of old-age benefits than they have made provisions to finance.
This paper models the era of fiscal stress as stemming from relentlessly growing promised government
transfers that initially are fully honored, being financed by new sales of government debt that bring
forth higher future income taxes. As debt levels and tax rates rise, the population's tolerance for taxation
declines and the probability of reaching the fiscal limit increases. At the limit a fixed tax rate is adopted,
adjustments in taxes no longer stabilize debt, and some new stabilizing combination of policies must
arise.  We examine how, in the period before the fiscal limit, rapidly rising debt interacts with expectations
of how and when policies will adjust. Temporarily explosive debt has no effect on inflation if households
expect all adjustments to occur through entitlements reform, but if households believe it is possible
that in the future monetary policy will shift from targeting inflation to stabilizing debt, then debt feeds
directly into the path of inflation and monetary policy can no longer control inflation. News that reduces
expected primary surpluses can bring future inflation into the present, well before the news shows
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1 Introduction
Every economy faces a “ﬁscal limit”—a point beyond which tax collections can no longer
rise and government expenditures cannot be further reduced. At that limit, primary ﬁscal
surpluses are at their maximum. The expected present value of those maximum surpluses,
according to conventional bond valuation reasoning, yields the largest value of government
debt that the economy can support.
Fiscal limits may be imposed by either economic or political forces. Economies face
a natural ﬁscal limit that arises because most taxes on factor incomes are subject to a
Laﬀer curve, which implies an upper bound on revenues as a share of GDP. Many European
countries may be approaching the peak of their Laﬀer curves for labor taxes, according
to the steady state analysis of Trabandt and Uhlig (2009). Of course, Laﬀer curves are
actually complicated objects that move around with shocks to the economy, so the actual
economic limit to taxation is unknown. On the spending side of the ﬁscal limit, most societies
have made decisions about the minimal role they wish their governments to play, placing
a lower bound on spending. At one extreme, some minimal level of spending is required
just to maintain the government’s infrastructure investments and meet interest payments on
outstanding government debt.
In practice, the eﬀective limit on tax rates lies well below the peak of the Laﬀer curve.
Growing political clout of the tea party in the United States is a recent manifestation of
Americans’ intolerance for taxation, despite the fact that U.S. tax rates lie well below their
Laﬀer curve peaks, according to Trabandt and Uhlig’s calculations. Fiscal reforms underway
in Europe, whether increases in retirement ages in France, reductions in government pen-
sions in Greece, or tightening of unemployment compensation requirements in Sweden, can
be understood as political responses in economies that are approaching their ﬁscal limits.
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Resistance to the reforms can place lower bounds on government spending programs. More
generally, ﬁscal limits will be driven by the political processes which determine how averse
societies are to high taxes and how much societies value government spending on both goods
and services and social programs.
Evidently, ﬁscal limits are country-speciﬁc, depending on a country’s economic and po-
litical arrangements, and time-varying, shifting with the economic and political shocks that
hit the economy. Although the state dependence of ﬁscal limits is conceptually clear, it
makes them diﬃcult to measure and quantify. But those diﬃculties do not diminish the
potentially central role that ﬁscal limits play in inﬂuencing macroeconomic policy choices,
private expectations of monetary and ﬁscal policies, and economic outcomes.
In normal times, when government ﬁnancing needs exhibit stable ﬂuctuations, ﬁscal limits
can be of little consequence for the macroeconomic impacts of monetary and ﬁscal policies.
Even if policies do not immediately adjust to stabilize debt, people have good reason to
believe that eventually stabilization will occur, just as it has in the past. By extension,
this implies that in normal times expectations of ﬁscal policy are well anchored by past
ﬁscal behavior. With only a few exceptions, normal times characterize conditions in most
advanced economies up to now. But normal times are coming to a close.
Many advanced economies are heading into an era of ﬁscal stress. Populations are aging
and governments have made substantially more promises of old-age beneﬁts than they have
provisions for ﬁnancing those beneﬁts. Table 1 reports the International Monetary Fund’s
(2009) calculations of the net present value of aging-related spending in several advanced
economies. Averaged across the G-20 countries, spending promises exceed funding plans
to the tune of 400 percent of GDP. In the United States alone, the long-term imbalance
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Table 1: Net present value of impact on ﬁscal deﬁcit of aging-related spending, in percent
of GDP. Source: International Monetary Fund (2009).
In an era of ﬁscal stress, past policy behavior may be a poor guide to future behavior and,
therefore, a weak reed on which to base policy expectations. When the stress is unresolved,
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ﬁscal expectations are unanchored and people are forced to speculate about future policy
actions. Unanchored ﬁscal expectations can undermine the ability of monetary policy to
control inﬂation and inﬂuence economic activity in the usual ways, as Leeper (2010a,b) em-
phasizes. Eusepi and Preston (2010) obtain similar implications for the eﬃcacy of monetary
policy in an environment in which agents are learning about the ﬁscal policy regime.
This paper models the era of ﬁscal stress as stemming from promised government transfers
to private citizens, which are growing relentlessly as a share of GDP, just as they do in many
countries’ long-term projections that embed anticipated demographic shifts. In the model,
the promised transfers initially are fully honored, being ﬁnanced by new sales of government
debt that bring forth higher future income taxes. As debt levels and tax rates rise, the
population’s tolerance for taxation declines and the probability of reaching the ﬁscal limit
increases. At the limit a ﬁxed tax rate is adopted and adjustments in taxes can no longer
stabilize debt.
A probabilistic ﬁscal limit of this form reﬂects two features of the political economy of
debt stabilization. First, even though the economy is well below the peak of the Laﬀer
curve, meaning that it is feasible to raise revenues by increasing tax rates, the willingness of
political leaders to do so declines as the electorate grows more disgruntled with high taxes.
This feature reﬂects a key insight by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) that a government’s decision
to honor its debt obligations is rarely about its ability to pay.1 Second, the likelihood of
hitting the ﬁscal limit depends on economic conditions—the state of government indebtedness
and tax rates—and on random political outcomes that may be more closely related to the
electorate’s reactions to ﬁscal decisions—street protests in the capital city, for example—
than to the ﬁscal decisions themselves. Uncertainty about future ﬁscal adjustments is a key
characteristic of actual ﬁscal environments in advanced economies heading into an era of
ﬁscal stress.
A rational expectations equilibrium with no outright government default requires that
at the ﬁscal limit people must believe that policies will eventually adjust to stabilize debt.
Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010, 2011) posit that either transfers adjust so that deliv-
ered transfer payments are less than promised, while monetary policy targets inﬂation, or
promised transfers continue to be honored, but monetary policy sacriﬁces inﬂation targeting
in order to maintain the value of debt. Each of these regimes has either ﬁscal policy or
monetary policy acting to stabilize debt.
In this paper we allow for those policy adjustments, but expand the set of post-ﬁscal limit
policies to include a regime in which neither monetary nor ﬁscal policy stabilizes debt, at least
temporarily. A temporary regime with unstable government debt is of practical relevance
for a number of reasons. First, we have observed economies that go through periods in
which debt grows rapidly and fears of “unsustainable” policies are raised.2 Second, this is
a policy scenario that may well play out in coming years in economies that have diﬃculty
consolidating ﬁscal policy on the heels of the large stimulus packages implemented in 2009
in response to the recession and ﬁnancial crisis. As economies recover and inﬂation picks
1Bi (2009) elaborates on this point in the context of sovereign debt default.
2Witness the concerns of many European governments in 2010. Davig and Leeper (2006) estimate that
such a regime occurred in the United States in the early-to-mid 1980s, which was a period that inspired a
cottage industry to “test” the government’s intertemporal budget constraint [Hamilton and Flavin (1986),
Davig (2005) and many others].
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up, central banks may shift back to their normal policies of aggressively ﬁghting inﬂation
well before ﬁscal consolidations are in place. We are already seeing this happen in Canada,
Norway, and Sweden, which have begun to raise their policy interest rates. More hawkish
monetary policies in the face of unresolved ﬁscal stress could easily produce triply active
policies.3 Conventional models that do not allow for policy regime change cannot examine
triply active policies and are silent about the macroeconomic consequences of this likely policy
scenario. Third, in a period of unresolved, and unprecedented, ﬁscal stress, it is reasonable
for economic decision makers to believe that a wide range of policy regimes are possible,
with a regime in which no policy authority stabilizes debt just one of several possibilities.
The possibility of temporarily unstable government debt can have profound inﬂationary
consequences in an economy with a probabilistic ﬁscal limit that incorporates the public’s
limited tolerance for taxation. Fiscal behavior can undermine the central bank’s ability to
control inﬂation and the central bank’s loss of inﬂation control is not due to the bank’s lack
of resolve to ﬁght inﬂation.
We also examine the inﬂationary consequences of news that discretely shifts the public’s
beliefs about the government’s long-run ﬁscal situation. If that news reduces the expected
path of primary surpluses, future inﬂation can be brought into the present, well before the
n e w ss h o w su pi nﬁ s c a lm e a s u r e s .
2 Contacts with Literature
In any dynamic economy monetary and ﬁscal policies have two tasks: to control inﬂation and
to maintain the value of government debt. The conventional assignment, in which inﬂation
is a monetary phenomenon, tasks monetary policy with controlling inﬂation and ﬁscal policy
with maintaining the value of debt. This conventional assignment dates back at least to
Friedman (1960) and is reﬂected in the modern new Keynesian models of Gal´ ı (2008) and
Woodford (2003).
An alternative assignment of the two tasks is possible, however. Fiscal policy could be
assigned to control inﬂation, leaving monetary policy to maintain the value of debt. This
assignment delivers the ﬁscal theory of the price level associated with Leeper (1991), Sims
(1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1999). American policies during and immediately
after World War Two are a well-known example of this assignment: taxes were unable to
keep pace with war spending, producing rapid increases in government debt issuance; the
Fed pegged nominal interest rates to ensure high bond prices that helped ﬁnance the war
eﬀort.
Perhaps less appreciated is that policies in many countries during the past several years
likely also fall into this category. After reducing policy interest rates to or near their zero
lower bound, many central banks began unconventional operations that massively expanded
their balance sheets. Coincident with the shift in monetary policy, ﬁscal authorities im-
plemented large stimulus packages that sharply raised ﬁscal deﬁcits, sometimes to unprece-
dented peacetime levels.
Some terminology can succinctly describe this policy behavior. A policy authority that
is free to pursue its objectives is called “active,” while an authority whose behavior is con-
3Norway and Sweden are not facing the ﬁscal stress that confronts many other countries. The numbers
in table 1, however, suggest that Canada has substantial long-run ﬁscal imbalances.
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strained is termed “passive,” following Leeper (1991). An active authority pays no attention
to the state of government debt and is free to set its control variable as it sees ﬁt. A pas-
sive authority responds to government debt shocks. Its behavior is constrained by private
optimization and the active authority’s actions. In the conventional assignment of tasks,
monetary policy is “active” and controls inﬂation, while ﬁscal policy is “passive” and sta-
bilizes debt. The alternative assignment reverses these: ﬁscal policy is “active” and free
to pursue its objectives, such as output stabilization, while monetary policy “passively”
maintains the value of government debt.
Because an active authority is not constrained by current budgetary conditions, it is
free to choose a decision rule that depends on past, current, or expected future variables.
A passive authority is constrained by consumer optimization and the active authority’s
actions, so it must generate suﬃcient primary surpluses to stabilize debt over time. Thus,
the passive authority’s decision rule necessarily depends on the current state of government
debt, as summarized by current and past variables.4
This paper is a close cousin to Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant monetarist arith-
metic, but with an unusual twist. Sargent and Wallace consider a setting in which the ﬁscal
limit is couched as a maximum debt-GDP level. In the period before the limit, monetary and
ﬁscal policies are both active, setting the money stock and the primary surplus exogenously.
Government debt grows until it hits the limit at a known date T,a tw h i c hp o i n tm o n e y
growth becomes endogenous, determined by the need to service the debt level b(T). Before
the ﬁscal limit, policies are doubly active; after the limit, ﬁscal policy is active and monetary
policy is passive, a regime that is an absorbing state. Long-run expectations of policies are
pinned down by this absorbing state.
Our work turns this sequence of policy regimes on its head. In the period before the limit,
tax policy passively raises rates in response to growing debt, while monetary policy actively
targets inﬂation by following the Taylor principle. At the limit, tax rates are constant, so tax
policy becomes active, but monetary and transfers policies continue to be active. This triply
4Viewing active policy as forward-looking and passive policy as backward-looking is consistent with the
“rules versus authorities” debate [Simons (1936)]. Friedman (1948) argues against “discretionary action
in response to cyclical movements” (p. 250) because it requires policy makers “to forecast accurately the
economic changes that would occur in the absence of government action” (p. 255). In his 1948 proposal,
however, Friedman does not oppose “automatic” responses of ﬁscal variables to ﬂuctuations in economic
activity. The model we use interprets the automatic behavior as passively setting policy instruments as a
function of current and past variables, which does not require knowing the true processes generating the
shocks. There are many other precedents for the active-passive taxonomy of policy behavior. Citing the rapid
money growth in the early 60s, Samuelson (1967, p. 6) describes American policy in 1961-1965 as “a case of
active ﬁscal policy which was coupled with or ﬁnanced by a supporting monetary policy” [emphasis added].
In his view, monetary policy accommodates ﬁscal expansions to counteract the interest-rate increases that
would crowd out investment. In this paper, monetary accommodation prevents deﬁcit shocks from raising
interest rates and producing an explosive path of government debt. Olivera (1970) and Black (1972) deﬁne an
exogenous money stock as active monetary policy and an exogenous price level as requiring passive monetary
policy. In Sargent’s (1986) depiction of a Ricardian regime, the monetary authority is the “dominant player,”
while the ﬁscal authority “follows” and raises taxes as necessary to balance the budget. This is consistent with
active monetary and passive ﬁscal policies. Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
arises from a coordination scheme in which “ﬁscal policy dominates monetary policy” and “the monetary
authority faces the constraints imposed by the demand for government bonds....” This corresponds to active
ﬁscal and passive monetary behavior.
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active regime coincides with Sargent and Wallace’s assumptions about policies before period
T. Triply active policies are persistent, but transient in our setup. Each period policies can
change instead to a mix of passive monetary and active transfers or a combination of active
monetary and passive transfers. Eventually, though, the economy converges to an absorbing
state in which monetary policy actively targets inﬂation and transfers passively adjust to
stabilize debt.
Sargent and Wallace’s result that, even in a monetarist economy, monetary policy may
not be able to control inﬂation, plays oﬀ of their absorbing state in which monetary policy
is passively constrained to meet the needs of ﬁscal policy. A Cagan (1956)-style money
demand function can then bring that future loss of inﬂation control into the present. In
contrast, we examine a situation in which the absorbing state is one in which monetary
policy can perfectly control inﬂation and long-run expectations are anchored on this active
monetary/passive transfers regime. Our economy is also in a regime with active monetary
and passive tax policies in the period before the ﬁscal limit. Transient states that may be
realized at the limit, before reaching the absorbing state, however, can undermine monetary
policy’s control of inﬂation in all periods before the absorbing state is realized.
Compared to Sargent and Wallace, our setup lays out substantially weaker conditions
under which monetary policy may not be able to control inﬂation. Monetary control of
inﬂation may be far more diﬃcult than Sargent and Wallace describe.
It turns out that how the ﬁscal limit is modeled can matter a great deal for the model’s
implications. Leeper (2010a) examines an endowment economy in which at some known
future date T, taxes hit their maximum and remain ﬁxed. Before the limit, monetary policy
actively targets inﬂation and taxes passively rise with debt; after the limit, monetary policy
switches to passively pegging the short-term nominal interest rate, while taxes are constant at
their limit. Policies in periods t ≥ T produce a ﬁscal theory of the price level equilibrium. In
the absence of a ﬁscal limit, policies in periods t<Twould produce the conventional Taylor
principle outcome in which monetary policy successfully targets inﬂation. The presence
of a ﬁscal limit and forward-looking economic behavior, however, bring the ﬁscal theory
equilibrium into the pre-limit period to produce some surprising results. Monetary policy
can no longer control inﬂation, even in the pre-limit period. A stronger response of taxes to
debt before period T raises the volatility of the value of debt and of inﬂation. More hawkish
monetary policy makes expected inﬂation more unhinged from the inﬂation target in the
pre-limit period.
More elaborate models in which the timing of the ﬁscal limit is uncertain, as in Davig,
Leeper, and Walker (2010, 2011), do not as strongly exhibit these seemingly perverse results.
For example, stronger responses of taxes to debt temper the endogenously rising probability
of the ﬁscal limit, postponing its impacts. Monetary policy continues to lose its ability to
control actual and expected inﬂation, but the loss of control is more subtle.
3 Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and Inflation: A Primer
Most macroeconomists have been weaned on Friedman’s aphorism that “inﬂation is always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,” and most macroeconomic models build this per-
spective in as a necessary implication. Sargent and Wallace (1981) dramatically demon-
strated that ﬁscal policy can be the driving force behind inﬂation, but even in their work
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inﬂation is determined entirely by the interaction of supply and demand for money: in
equilibrium, inﬂation equals money growth.
Recent work under the rubric of the ﬁscal theory of the price level broadens this perspec-
tive on the determination of inﬂation by considering environments in which the government
issues nominal debt.5 The theory points to circumstances in which inﬂation is driven by an
equilibrium condition that connects the value of that debt to the expected discounted value
of primary surpluses and seigniorage.
More generally, inﬂation is always determined by the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal
policies. There are special cases in which it appears to be a monetary phenomenon and other
cases in which it seems to be a ﬁscal phenomenon. This section develops a simple framework
that makes this general point.
The model that follows ascribes simple parametric interpretations to active and passive
monetary and ﬁscal policy behavior, deﬁned in section 2, and characterizes the nature of
inﬂation determination in the two policy mixes that allow policies to control inﬂation and
stabilize government debt.
3.1 The Model To streamline the algebra, we assume that there are no real eﬀects
from monetary and ﬁscal actions and abstract from any monetary frictions by assuming that
real money balances are a negligible share of GDP.6 These assumptions make the model a
constant endowment economy that is at the cashless limit.
The economy consists of a representative household, a monetary authority, and a ﬁscal
authority. The household pays lump-sum taxes, τt, receives lump-sum transfers, zt, and
holds one-period nominal bonds paying gross risk-free nominal interest Rt. Consumption






subject to the budget constraint
ct + Bt/Pt + τt = yt + zt + Rt−1Bt−1/Pt (2)
with R−1B−1 > 0 given. Government purchases are zero in each period so that goods market
clearing implies ct = yt = y. In equilibrium the household’s consumption/saving decision
produces a simple Fisher relation that links the nominal interest rate to the (constant) real









5In advanced economies, the vast majority of government debt is nominal and denominated in home
currency. In the United States, 90 percent is nominal; in the United Kingdom, 80 percent is; nominal
debt constitutes over 90 percent of government debt in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden; most
European Monetary Union members’ debt is nominal; all but a tiny fraction of Japanese government bonds
are nominal.
6The model setup is similar to Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and Woodford (2001). More realistic environ-
ments have been studied elsewhere [Woodford (1998), Davig and Leeper (2006, 2011), Sims (2011)].
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where β ∈ (0,1) is the household’s discount factor.













More hawkish policies set α larger and reduce ﬂuctuations of inﬂation around target.
Fiscal policy attempts to target the real value of government debt (or the debt-GDP










Government transfer payments to the household are the sole source of uncertainty in
the model. Additional sources of uncertainty could be introduced, but they would not alter
the basic story of inﬂation determination. We imagine that transfers evolve exogenously
according to a known stochastic process. The growth rate of transfers is permitted to be
positive, but it must be bounded to ensure that transfers do not grow faster than the real
interest rate.
The government’s ﬂow budget constraint is
Bt
Pt




so any shortfall in revenues over transfers and debt service is ﬁnanced by new bond sales.
The household behaves rationally and takes account of the actual policy behavior—rules
(4)a n d( 5)—and of the evolution of transfers to form rational expectations over future prices,
transfers, and taxes.
3.2 Regime M: Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal Policies The ﬁrst policy mix is
familiar to most macroeconomists and accords well with how many central bankers perceive
their behavior. We label this “Regime M.” Regime M emerges when the central bank aggres-
sively targets inﬂation by raising the nominal interest rate sharply in response to incipient
inﬂation (α>1) and ﬁscal policy reacts to higher debt by raising taxes enough to achieve
the debt target (γ>r=1 /β − 1). This combination is active monetary policy and passive
ﬁscal policy.
The equilibrium in this regime is obtained by solving the diﬀerence equation in inﬂation

















The solution is that inﬂation always equals its target, as does expected inﬂation.7
πt = π
∗ (8)
7Technically, there are many solutions to (7), where all but the solution in (8) have inﬂation diverging
from target without bound [see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1983), Sims (1994), and Cochrane (2007) for further
discussion].
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The stabilization of debt by tax policy can be seen from combining the tax rule, (5), with


















Because β−1−γ<1, higher debt brings forth the expectation of higher taxes, so (9) describes
how debt is expected to return to its target, b∗, following a shock to transfers, zt. Tax policy,
through the choice of γ, stabilizes debt in the face of disturbances that move debt away from
b∗. A higher value of γ in the tax rule adjusts taxes more aggressively and retires debt back
to target more rapidly.
3.3 Regime F: Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal Policies Regime F combines
active tax policy, 0 ≤ γ<1/β − 1, with passive monetary policy, 0 ≤ α<1/β. This policy
mix delivers a ﬁscal theory of the price level.
We focus on a particular policy mix that yields clean economic interpretations: the
nominal interest rate is set independently of inﬂation, α =0a n dR
−1
t = R∗−1 ≥ 1, and taxes
are set independently of debt, γ =0a n dτt = τ∗ > 0. These policy speciﬁcations might seem
extreme and special, but the qualitative points that emerge generalize to other speciﬁcations
of passive monetary/active tax policies.
One result pops out immediately. Applying the pegged nominal interest rate policy to











so expected inﬂation is anchored on the inﬂation target, an outcome that is perfectly consis-
tent with one aim of inﬂation-targeting central banks. It turns out, however, that another
aim of inﬂation targeters—stabilization of actual inﬂation—which can be achieved by active
monetary/passive ﬁscal policy, is no longer attainable.














The value of government debt at t (or the debt-output ratio) is completely determined by
tax and transfers policies expected in the future. A higher ﬁxed level of taxes, τ∗, or a lower
expected path of transfers, Et
 ∞
j=1 βjzt+j,r a i s e st h ev a l u eo fd e b t .
8Expression (11) is derived in several steps. Write the government budget constraint, (6), at time
t + 1, impose the tax rule that τt = τ∗, take expectations conditional on information at time t, and im-
pose the Fisher equation, (3), to replace EtRt/πt+1 with 1/β. Iterate forward on the resulting expression
and impose the transversality condition for debt that ensures the agent’s maximization problem is solved,
limT→∞ EtβTbT =0 ,t oo b t a i n( 11). By imposing market clearing and private optimizing behavior on
the government’s budget constraint, we arrive at an equilibrium condition, not a constraint on government
behavior.
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At time t, the numerator of the left side of this expression is predetermined, representing
the nominal value of household wealth carried into period t. The right side is the expected
present value of primary ﬁscal surpluses from date t on, which is exogenous. So long as
R∗Bt−1 > 0 and the present value of revenues exceeds the present value of transfers, a
condition that must hold if government debt has positive value, expression (12) delivers a
unique Pt > 0.9
Using the solution for the price level in (12) to compute expected inﬂation, it is straight-
forward to show that βEt(Pt/Pt+1)=1 /R∗, as required by the Fisher relation and monetary
policy behavior. This observation leads to a sharp dichotomy between the roles of monetary
and ﬁscal policy in price-level determination: monetary policy alone appears to determine
expected inﬂation by choosing the level at which to peg the nominal interest rate, R∗−1, while
conditional on that choice, ﬁscal variables appear to determine realized inﬂation. This is the
essence of the ﬁscal theory of the price level.
3.4 Discussion Regime M—the usual assignment of policy responsibilities in which mon-
etary policy controls inﬂation—relies on ﬁscal policy to ensure that any increase in govern-
ment debt creates the expectation of higher taxes in the future.10 Those higher taxes are just
suﬃcient to gradually retire debt back to its target level, eliminating any wealth eﬀect from
the debt expansion and, therefore, any pressure on inﬂation to rise. This Ricardian ﬁscal
adjustment is critical for monetary policy to successfully control inﬂation. For example, if
the central bank were to contract policy by exogenously increasing the interest rate via an
open-market sale of government bonds to the public, this must generate higher expected
taxes for the monetary contraction to reduce inﬂation. If taxes were not expected to rise,
higher bond holdings would raise the public’s nominal wealth, which would increase nominal
demand and inﬂation.
Higher inﬂation from a monetary contraction is one of several unusual implications of









9We have done nothing mystical here, despite what some critics claim [for example, Buiter (2002) or
McCallum (2001)]. In particular, the government is not assumed to behave in a manner that violates its
budget constraint [see footnote 8]. Unlike competitive households, the government is not required to choose
sequences of control variables that are consistent with its budget constraint for all possible price sequences.
Indeed, for a central bank to target inﬂation, it cannot be choosing its policy instrument to be consistent with
any sequence of the price level; doing so would produce an indeterminate equilibrium. Identical reasoning
applies to the ﬁscal authority: the value of a dollar of debt—1/Pt—depends on expectations about ﬁscal
decisions in the future; expectations, in turn, are determined by the tax rule the ﬁscal authority announces.
The ﬁscal authority credibly commits to its tax rule and, given the process for transfers, this determines the
backing of government debt and, therefore, its market value.
10In this model, we force taxes to adjust, but more generally Regime M requires that higher debt creates
higher expected primary surpluses.
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This equilibrium echoes Sargent and Wallace’s (1981) unpleasant arithmetic result: if the
central bank chooses a higher pegged nominal interest rate for R∗, inﬂation rises. Unpleas-
antness arises for very diﬀerent reasons in the ﬁscal theory. Higher R∗ raises nominal interest
payments that the agents receives on holdings of government debt. With taxes ﬁxed at τ∗,
higher interest payments do not portend higher future taxes, so the agent feels richer and
tries to raise her consumption path. When output is ﬁxed, higher nominal demand simply
raises inﬂation.
Expression (13) also makes clear the sense in which inﬂation is a ﬁscal phenomenon in
Regime F. News that transfer payments will rise or that the ﬁxed level of taxes will fall,
both raise the agent’s perception of her wealth—because there will be no oﬀsetting ﬁscal
adjustments in the future—and raises her consumption demand and, therefore, inﬂation.
In Regime F, monetary policy loses its ability to control inﬂation because ﬁscal policy
is unable or unwilling to adjust future surpluses to sustain government debt. Instead, the
value of that debt must adjust to be consistent with expected surpluses and that adjustment
occurs through changes in the price level that alter the value of debt. Monetary policy is
nevertheless playing a critical role in allowing the equilibrium to hang together. Suppose that
the central bank were to try to counteract the ﬁscally-induced rise in inﬂation by sharply
raising the nominal interest rate (as it would if it were behaving actively). This would
increase nominal interest payments on debt and, because ﬁscal policy is active, increase
nominal demand and inﬂation. Higher inﬂation would trigger still more increases in nominal
interest rates, nominal demand, and inﬂation: the process is unstable; debt would grow
exponentially and lose its value. Doubly active policies, if they were to persist, can produce
explosive inﬂation, as Sims (2011) shows.
Fiscal behavior in Regime F leads to a natural interpretation of what happens at a
ﬁscal limit: primary surpluses no longer adjust to stabilize debt. At the ﬁscal limit, one of
two outcomes are possible. Either monetary policy will switch to being passive, as it does
in Regime F, or it continues to be active and neither monetary nor ﬁscal policy stabilizes
debt. Permanently doubly active policies that generate explosive growth in real debt cannot
happen if government debt is to retain its value. But temporarily an economy can visit
a regime in which debt is unstable, so long as bond holders expect that eventually either
monetary or ﬁscal policy will revert to passive behavior that stabilizes debt’s value.
4 Modeling Fiscal Limits
We examine two general methods to model the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit—one
exogenous and the other state-dependent—and variations within each method. Let τt denote
the proportional tax rate on income and let τmax denote the value of the tax rate at the ﬁscal
limit. When the economy hits the ﬁscal limit, monetary and ﬁscal policies change regime
and in the period before the limit is triggered, agents’ expectations are driven, in part, by
beliefs about those post-limit policies.
4.1 Exogenous Limits One simple method to set an exogenous ﬁscal limit posits a
ﬁxed probability, pL, each period that the economy will hit the limit. At the limit, τt = τmax
forever. Because pL is independent both of the state of the economy and of time, this method
does not generate time-varying expectations, as does the alternative method discussed below.
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Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010) and Leeper (2010a) assume that at some known date in
the future, T, the ﬁscal limit kicks in and the tax rate becomes permanently set at τmax.A s
mentioned above, this method generates some unusual implications. It also produces time-
varying expectations that are more volatile the farther into the future T is; as T approaches,
the equilibrium converges to the post-limit equilibrium.
The ﬁxed probability of hitting the limit each period generalizes the known T limit.
Based on the probability, 1−pL, the pre-limit regime has expected duration (1 −pL)−1 and
based on that duration, there is some expected T date.
4.2 Endogenous Limits Of more economic interest is ﬁscal limits that are triggered
by recent ﬁscal policy actions. It is not diﬃcult to imagine the populace reacting against
repeated increases in tax rates brought on by growing government debt. One way to model
this, which retains the stochastic nature, is with a logistic function. Let pL,t be the probability
of hitting the ﬁscal limit at date t,w h e r epL,t obeys
pL,t =1−
exp(η0 − η1(τt−1 − τ∗)
1+e x p ( η0 − η1(τt−1 − τ∗)
(14)
where τ∗ is some reference tax rate and both η0 and η1 are positive parameters. When
coupled with a tax rule such as
τt = τ
∗ + γ(bt−1 − b
∗) (15)
expression (14) means that as the debt-GDP ratio, bt, rises above a reference ratio, b∗,t h e
tax rate rises and so, too, does the probability of reaching the ﬁscal limit. If the ﬁscal limit
is hit in period t,
τs = τ
max for all s ≥ t (16)
The parameters (η0,η 1)i n( 14) determine the initial probability and the speed at which
the probability rises with taxes. Alternative settings of these parameters can imply very
diﬀerent ﬁscal limit processes, ranging from ones in which the economy is expected to hit
the limit soon to ones in which the likely date of the limit is quite is remote. The paper will
characterize how equilibrium outcomes vary with these parameters. Figure 1 depicts one
logistic function whose impacts we derive in section 7 below.
5 Model and Solution Method
We use the canonical new Keynesian model with elastic labor supply and a ﬁxed capital
stock. Prices are perfectly ﬂexible so monetary policy cannot aﬀect real interest rates. We
expand the textbook model of, say, Woodford (2003) or Gal´ ı (2008), by adding nominal
government bonds, a distorting tax, and the possibility of monetary and ﬁscal policy regime
change.
We modify the model in Davig and Leeper (2006) in the following ways: add a dis-
torting proportional labor tax rate; introduce a ﬁscal limit along the lines that section 4
sketches; allow lump-sum transfers initially to follow a stationary stochastic process, which
then switches to a non-stationary process with some ﬁxed probability; posit how monetary
and ﬁscal policies adjust at the ﬁscal limit.
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Figure 1: Probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit as a function of the tax rate. Logistic function
in (14) with η0 and η1 set so that the initial probability is 2 percent and rises to 20 percent
by the year 2075.






















with 0 <β<1,σ>0,η>0,κ>0,χ>0a n dδ>0. Ct =







consumption good consisting of diﬀerentiated goods cjt,w h e r eθ>1 is the elasticity of
substitution across goods. Nt is labor and (Mt/Pt) denote real money balances.


















+Π t + λtzt (18)
where τt is a distorting tax levied on labor income, Bt is one-period nominal bond holdings,
Wt is the nominal wage rate, 1 + Rt−1 is the risk-free nominal interest rate between t − 1
and t,Π t are proﬁts from intermediate-goods producers, and λtzt are delivered lump-sum




































Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for household optimization require that (19)-(21)h o l d
in every period. In addition, the household’s budget constraint must bind, the present value










must hold, where At = Bt +Mt and qt,T is the real stochastic discount factor obtained from
the household’s Euler equation, (20).
5.2 Firms A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed by j produces
goods according to
yjt = ZNjt (23)
where Z is an aggregate measure of technology that is common across all ﬁrms and constant.
A ﬁnal goods producing ﬁrm purchases intermediate inputs at nominal prices Pt (j)a n d
produces the ﬁnal composite good by combining them using the constant-returns-to-scale
technology, Yt =






. Proﬁt maximization by the ﬁnal-goods producing ﬁrm















Each monopolistically competitive intermediate-goods producing ﬁrm chooses price Pt(j)


















yt (j) − Ψt(j)yt (j) (26)
where Ψt(j) is real marginal cost.
In a symmetric equilibrium, every intermediate goods producing ﬁrm faces the same
marginal costs, Ψt, and aggregate demand, Yt, so the pricing decision is the same for every
ﬁrm, implying Pt (j)=Pt. In steady-state, marginal costs are Ψ = (θ − 1)/θ, where Ψ−1 =
μ and μ is the steady-state markup of price over marginal cost.
The aggregate resource constraint is
Ct + Gt = Yt (27)
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5.3 Policy Specification The government ﬁnances a constant amount of government
purchases, G, and actual transfers, λtzt, with distorting taxes on labor, money creation, and



















In order to capture the non-stationary behavior of the transfers process, we assume
transfers follow a Markov switching process with two states,
zt =
 
(1 − ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + εt for Sz,t =1
μzt−1 + εt for Sz,t =2
(29)
where zt = Zt/Pt, |ρz| < 1, μ>1, μβ < 1,ε t ∼ N(0,σ 2
z). Regime 2 is characterized by
μ>1a n dβμ < 1, which allows the transfers process to be non-stationary, but square-
summable in discounted expectation. We use this process to capture the upward trend in
promised transfers that many countries are facing. The regimes, Szt, follow a Markov chain
that evolves according to
Πz =
 




where the regime with exploding promised transfers is an absorbing state. The expected
number of years until the switch from the stationary to nonstationary regime is (1 − pz)−1.
The stationary process has expected duration of about ﬁve years. This assumption is
designed to mimic the expected growth in transfers as a share of GDP that the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce annually reports in its long-term projections [Congressional Budget Oﬃce
(2010)] and are projected in many other advanced economies as well. We interpret this
transfers process for zt as “promised” transfers. “Delivered” transfers, λtzt,m a yb el e s st h a n
promised due to entitlements reform.
Exponential growth in transfers is initially ﬁnanced by new debt issuance, which is backed
by increasing tax rates. But there is a ﬁscal limit to the amount of debt that can be ﬁnanced
through tax increases. This is due to either reaching the peak of the Laﬀer curve or to
political resistance to tax hikes. We model this as setting τt = τmax for t ≥ T,w h e r eT is









for Sτ,t =1 ,t<T (Below Fiscal Limit)
τmax for Sτ,t =2 ,t≥ T (Fiscal Limit)
(31)
where b∗ is the target debt-output ratio and τ∗ is the steady-state tax rate.
Before the economy hits the ﬁscal limit, γ>0 is large enough to ensure that taxes
respond suﬃciently strongly to higher debt to cover real debt service plus some of the newly
issued principal. With stationary transfers, this passive ﬁscal stance would stabilize debt.
After the ﬁscal limit, tax rates are ﬁxed and, in the absence of other policy adjustments,
policy is unsustainable as debt would grow exponentially as a share of the economy.
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As in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2010, 2011), we assume that the probability of hitting
the ﬁscal limit, pLt, follows a logistic function
pL,t =1−
exp(η0 − η1 (τt−1 − τ∗))
1+e x p ( η0 − η1 (τt−1 − τ∗))
, (32)
where η1 > 0, so the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is increasing in taxes. Because
in the period leading up to the ﬁscal limit taxes respond passively to government debt, as
(31) describes, the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit increases with debt. Households are
aware of the maximum tax rate, τmax, but the precise timing of when that rate takes eﬀect
is uncertain.
Monetary policy is conventional in that it sets the short-term nominal interest rate in
response to deviations of inﬂation from its target
Rt = ¯ R + α(πt − π
∗) (33)
where π∗ is the target inﬂation rate. Monetary policy is active when α>1/β, so policy
satisﬁes the Taylor principle. We label the active regime as Sm,t = 1. Policy is passive when
0 ≤ α<1/β,(Sm,t =2 ) .
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the economy. The economy begins with stationary
transfers, passive ﬁscal and active monetary policy. With probability pz, the transfers process
becomes non-stationary, Sz = 2. The economy reaches the ﬁscal limit with probability pL,
tax policy becomes active (Sτ = 2) and monetary and transfers policies continue to remain
active. This regime captures a period of “gridlock” where monetary policy will not concede its
inﬂation target, yet ﬁscal policy cannot raise taxes or reduce transfers to stabilize government
debt. In a model with ﬁxed policy regimes and growing transfers, triply active policies are
not possible. Debt explodes, violating the transversality condition on government debt.
Households would not hold debt, so no equilibrium exists. In the current setting, however,
the triply active regime is expected to be only temporary, since households expect a transition
to a policy regime that will stabilize debt.








1 − pZ pZ 000
0 pL 1 − pL 00
00 p22 p23 p24








where pii is the probability of remaining in regime i. The ﬁrst column of (34) applies to the
stationary transfers process and the remaining four columns to the non-stationary transfers
process. In the triply active regime, debt grows rapidly, as shown below, and households
place a constant probability on moving to either a monetary regime that sacriﬁces its inﬂation
target (p23) or a ﬁscal regime that reneges on promised transfers (p24). Eventually, however,
policy moves to an absorbing state where debt and actual transfers are stabilized by the
ﬁscal authority reneging on promised transfers.

































Figure 2: Evolution of policy regimes. pZ: probability of non-stationary transfers process;
pL,t: probability of ﬁscal limit; AM: active monetary policy; PF: passive ﬁscal policy; AT:
active transfers policy; PM: passive monetary policy; AF: active ﬁscal policy; PT: passive
transfers policy.
5.4 Solution Method We solve the model numerically using the monotone map method
described in Davig and Leeper (2006). Further details are provided in Davig, Leeper, and
Walker (2010).
6C a l i b r a t i o n
The parameters over preferences, technology and price adjustment are consistent with the
values in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003). We calibrate the model
at an annual frequency because the purpose of the model is to study the impact of ﬁscal
policy over a relatively long horizon. Intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms markup the price
of their good by 15 percent over marginal cost, so μ = θ(1−θ)−1 =1 .15. Prices are ﬂexible,
which is not unreasonable in an annual model. The annual real interest rate is set to 2.5
percent, with β = .975. Preferences over consumption and leisure are logarithmic, σ =1
and η =1 . W es e tχ so the steady state share of time spent in employment is 0.2. For
real money balances, we set δ so velocity in the deterministic steady state, deﬁned as cP/M,
corresponds to the average U.S. monetary base velocity at 2.4.11 The interest elasticity of
real money balances, κ, is set to 2.6, which is consistent with Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000).
Average federal government purchases are a constant 8 percent share of output. In the
regime with stationary transfers, z∗ is calibrated so steady state transfers are 9 percent of
output. We also allow a small, but persistent, stochastic variation in the stationary transfers
11See Davig and Leeper (2006) for further details.
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process, ρZ = .9. Monetary policy is active in the regime with stationary transfers, where
the reaction of the nominal interest rate to inﬂation obeys the Taylor principle, so α =1 .5.
Fiscal policy is passive in the regime with stationary transfers with γ = .1. The inﬂation
target, π∗, is set to 2 percent and the initial steady state debt-output ratio in the regime
with stationary transfers is set to roughly 0.45, which implies that the initial average tax
rate is .198 (i.e. τ∗ = .2). This value is consistent with historical average tax rates in the
United States. The expected duration of the regime with stationary transfers is ﬁve years, so
pz = .8. This value corresponds to the amount of time before the CBO projects transfers will
begin their sustained upward trajectory [Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2009)]. Again using
CBO estimates, transfers grow at 1 percent per year once the switch from the stationary to
non-stationary regime occurs, μ =1 .01.
After the switch to the regime with exponentially growing transfers, the same monetary
and ﬁscal rules remain in place until the economy hits the ﬁscal limit. In the benchmark
calibration, the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit increases as debt and taxes rise, driven
by the growth in transfers. The probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit is time varying and
obeys the logistic function (32). η0 and η1 are set so that the initial probability of hitting
the ﬁscal limit is 2 percent. The probability rises as debt and taxes increase and reaches
about 20 percent by 2075. Figure 1 describes how the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit
rises with the tax rate.
At the ﬁscal limit, tax rates remain constant, since the assumption embedded in the
model is that further distortionary tax ﬁnancing beyond a given point is no longer available.
The tax rate at the limit is τmax = .23. In the regime with stationary transfers, this tax rate
supports a steady state debt-output ratio of 1.46. However, since transfers are well above
their value in the stationary regime when the economy hits the ﬁscal limit, the level at which
debt stabilizes is below 146 percent of GDP.
When the economy hits the ﬁscal limit and tax policy become active with rates are ﬁxed
at τmax, the economy temporarily enters a period of triply active policies: monetary policy
continues to target inﬂation and promised transfers are fully delivered. Triply active policies
persist with probability p22 = .70, implying an expected duration of 3-1/3 years. With
probability p23 = .05 monetary policy switches to passively pegging the nominal interest
rate (α = 0) and with probability p24 = .25 transfers policy becomes passive. Passive
transfers means that delivered transfers, λtzt, are less than promised. We assume the regime
with passive transfers and active monetary policy is absorbing (p44 = 1): in the long run
the economy transitions to a state in which lump-sum transfers stabilize debt, distorting tax
rates are constant, and monetary policy actively targets inﬂation.
7 Simulated Equilibrium Time Paths
It is useful, before launching into numerical results, to describe the long-run equilibrium of
the model.
7.1 The Long-Run Equilibrium In the absorbing state—the policy mix to which the
economy eventually converges—we obtain a Ricardian equilibrium. Call the date at which
the economy reaches the absorbing state, T A. Tax rates are ﬁxed at their limit, τmax,
monetary policy is active, and transfers policy adjusts to maintain the value of government
18Davig & Leeper: Temporarily Unstable Government Debt and Inflation
debt at the level it reached at the beginning of period T A, b(T A). Because transfers are
lump sum and can convert to becoming lump-sum taxes when λt < 0, delivered transfers
(or lump-sum taxes) can adjust as needed to stabilize debt at b(T A) without any changes in
equilibrium allocations or prices. In fact, the absorbing state is a new steady state in which
allocations are a function of τmax, the real interest rate is constant, and inﬂation returns to
its initial steady state value.
We can use the government’s budget constraint to back out the level of promised transfers.














where mTA−1 and RTA−1 denote real money balances and the nominal interest rate in the
period before the absorbing state, π∗ is the initial steady state inﬂation rate, and m(τmax)
and Y (τmax) are new steady state values of real money balances and output at the ﬁscal














As expression (36) makes clear, in the absorbing state transfers policy passively adjusts in
order to stabilize debt at b(T A), given the limiting tax rate and the steady state inﬂation
rate.
As we now see, despite the fact that the economy converges with probability one to a
Ricardian equilibrium in which active monetary policy can perfectly target inﬂation, in the
transition to this long-run equilibrium monetary policy will be unable to control inﬂation.
7.2 Triply Active Policies at the Fiscal Limit We begin with a contrast of the
diﬀerence between how exogenous and endogenous probabilities of a ﬁscal limit discussed
in section 4 aﬀect outcomes in the pre-limit period. We present counterfactuals in which
we impose that regime changes occur at particular dates. Agents in the model do not know
those dates ex-ante, but they do observe the regime changes when they occur. Agents use the
probability distributions described above to form expectations and, at the time of a regime
change, those expectations may shift discretely. If regime change does not occur, agents also
update their beliefs about future policies.
The two counterfactuals have the same underlying driving process: deterministic growth
in transfers of 1 percent per year, as shown in the lower right panel of ﬁgures 3 and 4.B o t h
experiments begin with a stable transfers process that switches to the growing process in
2015, where it remains over the full period. Shaded regions in the ﬁgures depict the triply
active episode which is triggered by hitting the ﬁscal limit in 2040. For 25 years in these
counterfactuals, promised transfers, which are growing as a share of GDP, are fully honored
and ﬁnanced by new debt issuance that, via the tax rule, generates higher future labor income
taxes. Monetary policy is actively targeting inﬂation by raising nominal interest rates more
than one-for-one with inﬂation. This policy mix is consistent with the conventional regime
in new Keynesian monetary analyses [for example, Gal´ ı (2008) and Woodford (2003)].
Figure 3 depicts equilibrium outcomes from this experiment when there is a ﬁxed prob-
ability of hitting the limit each period (pL = .02). In the context of ﬁgure 1, η1 =0a n dt h e
logistic function is ﬂat at probability .02, independent of the prevailing tax rate.
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In the period leading up to the ﬁscal limit, years 2010–2039, government debt rises
steadily as a share of the GDP, bringing with it higher tax rates that discourage work eﬀort
and reduce output. Inﬂation and, through the active monetary policy rule, nominal interest
rates, rise only very modestly in the pre-limit period. Modest inﬂation eﬀects are a direct
outgrowth of the time-invariant probability of the limit, as we shall see.







































































































Figure 3: Simulated paths under a constant probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit. Shaded
areas represent period of triply active policy.
When the limit is triggered in 2040 the tax rate jumps to the exogenously set τmax of
.23, generating corresponding drops in labor and output and increases in debt, inﬂation, and
the nominal interest rate. At the limit—shaded regions in the ﬁgure—tax rates, labor, and
output are constant. Inﬂation, however, begins to rise much more rapidly and debt begins
to grow exponentially.12
Modeling the ﬁscal limit as state-dependent, as in the logistic function in ﬁgure 1,b r i n g s
eﬀects that occur in the triply active policy regime into the present, generating stronger
impacts in the pre-limit period. Rising debt-ﬁnanced transfers raise tax rates and, therefore,
the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit. A higher likelihood of moving to the triply active
regime in which debt grows rapidly, raising inﬂation and the nominal interest rate, bringing
12Constancy of labor and output is due to ﬂexible prices. Sticky price adjustment will imply that active
monetary policy steadily raises real interest rates in an eﬀort to combat inﬂation. Higher real rates will aﬀect
labor and consumption and it will also put debt growth on an even higher trajectory as real debt service
increases.
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those eﬀects into the pre-limit period.
Figure 4 superimposes the ﬁxed-probability outcomes from ﬁgure 3 (solid lines) on those
that emerge from a time-varying probability of the ﬁscal limit (dashed lines). At the ﬁscal
limit, the two are identical. Leading up to the limit, however, a time-varying probability
produces a jump in debt at the time that transfers begin to grow, which produces consistently
higher debt and tax rate paths and lower labor path.







































































































Figure 4: Simulated paths under a rising probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit (dashed lines)
and a ﬁxed probability of hitting the limit (solid lines). Shaded areas represent period of
triply active policy.
It may be surprising that a rising probability of triply active policies or even the realiza-
tion of such a regime produces rising inﬂation. After all, the dominant long-run (ergodic)
regime is one in which delivered lump-sum transfers passively adjust to stabilize debt while
monetary policy actively targets inﬂation. This is the canonical regime used to study in-
ﬂation targeting [see, for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) or any of the papers in
Taylor (1999)]. How does the steady upward march of inﬂation from under 1.5 percent to
8.5 percent that appears in ﬁgure 4 arise?
Recall that in the triply active regime there is a small, .05, but positive probability of
moving to a regime with passive monetary and active transfers policies. If the economy moves
to that regime, it has an expected duration of 5 years before reaching the absorbing state of
active monetary and passive transfers policies. A passive monetary/active transfers regime,
if it were permanent, would produce a ﬁscal theory equilibrium in which debt is revalued
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through changes in the price level. In a ﬁscal theory equilibrium, inﬂation is determined by
ﬁscal ﬁnancing needs and not controlled by monetary policy. Hitting such a regime with
one-period nominal debt produces a spike in the inﬂation rate, as Davig, Leeper, and Walker
(2011) examine in detail.
In the counterfactuals we conduct, passive monetary policy is never realized, but it re-
mains a possible policy outcome to which agents attach positive probability. Even a 5 percent
chance of a ﬁscal theory outcome in the face of ﬁscal stress can drive the inﬂation rate up
substantially, even if in the current regime monetary policy is aggressively targeting inﬂation.
One message that is robust to how the ﬁscal limit is modeled is that a monetary policy
that satisﬁes the Taylor principle is unable to control inﬂation when the economy is staring
at a ﬁscal limit where there is some chance that monetary policy will switch to being passive.
State-dependence of the probability of the limit brings forward in time the eﬀects of triply
active policy behavior at the limit. Whether monetary policy loses control of inﬂation is not
in question, but the modeling of the ﬁscal limit matters for how severely the loss of control
manifests in higher inﬂation.
7.3 The Role of Monetary Policy It is remarkable that only a 5 percent chance
of passive monetary policy can trigger a substantial run-up in inﬂation. Inﬂation rises
monotonically with the likelihood of passive monetary policy. Figure 5 shows the cumulative
rise in the price level if the economy remains in the active monetary/passive tax/active
transfers regime for 35 years, as a function of the probability of passive monetary policy.
Even quite modest probabilities that the central bank will shift from targeting inﬂation to
stabilizing debt can produce substantially higher inﬂation rates.
How much inﬂation occurs depends, not only on the probability of passive monetary
policy, as ﬁgure 5 shows, but also on how much debt has accumulated before the economy
reaches its ﬁscal limit. Figure 6 reports the relationship between inﬂation and debt. Be-
cause promised—and, in the period before the ﬁscal limit, delivered—transfers are growing
exponentially, government debt in the period also grows as a share of GDP. The longer it
takes for the economy to hit the ﬁscal limit, the more debt builds up and the larger is the
burst of inﬂation that occurs if monetary policy turns passive at the limit. This relationship
stems from the logic of the ﬁscal theory. In the context of expression (13), at the ﬁscal limit
the denominator is a ﬁxed number, so the higher is the debt-output ratio, the higher will be
inﬂation when monetary policy switching to being passive.
8 Bad News About Future Surpluses
Equilibrium paths in the previous section paint a picture of a ﬁscal limit that is well into
the future and approaching only slowly. The dynamics arise from a low and slowly rising
probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit. In practice, however, ﬁscal crises typically arise abruptly
and then usually force sharp policy adjustments. In our framework, this suggests that the
probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit remains low and stable until some news arrives that
discretely shifts perceptions about future ﬁscal prospects. A sudden jump in ﬁscal pressures
can arise from a number of factors: revelations that a country’s accounting practices were
less than fully transparent and masked its ﬁscal shortfalls (as in the case of Greece); election
outcomes that induce ﬁscal consolidation sooner than expected (as is happening in the
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Figure 5: Cumulative price level increase, in percent, in the period before the ﬁscal limit, as
a function of the probability of passive monetary policy at the ﬁscal limit. Period of active
monetary, passive tax, and active transfers policies lasts 35 years in each case.
United Kingdom); surprising growth in the political clout of anti-tax constituencies (the
tea party movement in the United States). Although each of these can have important
economic consequences, they are not, in the ﬁrst instance, entirely reactions to the state of
the economy. Each contains an important exogenous component.
Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of future ﬁscal regimes and the corresponding probabil-
ities of transiting from one regime to another. The top portion of the diagram is the same as
in the previous section, except the framework is modiﬁed to now allow a change in the ex-
pected future tax rate at the ﬁscal limit. In the regime where transfers are steadily growing,
households now have a distribution over future tax rates at the ﬁscal limit. Previously, all
probability mass was attached to a single limiting tax rate, whereas now households believe
there are two possible limiting tax rates. We endow households with an expectation that
with probability pN, the tax rate at the ﬁscal limit will be τmax
low = .22, rather than τmax = .23.
This apparently minor adjustment substantially aﬀects of the amount of debt that can be
supported when the economy returns to its steady state. At the initial level of steady state
transfers, the .23 tax rate supports a debt-output ratio of 146 percent; a .22 tax rate reduces
the ratio to 112 percent. pN is set to a low value, .05, so that ex ante the lower limiting tax
rate is unlikely to be realized. However, if events materialize that reveal a country has less
capacity to tax than previously believed, or voters revolt and demand lower future taxes,
then expectations move to the lower branch of the diagram in ﬁgure 7. The news shock is
realized. Policy regimes do not change: monetary policy remains active, tax policy remains
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Figure 6: Relationship between inﬂation and debt when ﬁscal limit is realized at diﬀerent
dates and passive monetary policy occurs.
passive, and the promised transfers continue to be fully delivered.
To model a sudden rise in the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit, we allow a jump in
the probability by allowing a shock to expected future tax rates. Modify the logistic function
used to determine the probability of the ﬁscal limit as
pL,t =1−
exp(η0 − η1 (˜ τt−1 − τ∗))
1+e x p ( η0 − η1 (˜ τt−1 − τ∗))
, (37)
with ˜ τt−1 = τt−1 − ξt−1 and ξt = ξt−1 + ζt,w h e r e
ζt =
 
¯ ζ>0 with probability pN
0 with probability 1 − pN
(38)
This speciﬁcation has the eﬀect of permanently changing the limiting tax rate from τmax
to τmax
low = τmax − ¯ ζ. Suppose that no news arrives until period t − 1, so ξt−2 = 0, but
at t − 1 people learn that the limiting tax rate will be lower than previously believed. A
lower expected present value of tax revenues reduces the level of government debt that the
economy can support. Figure 8 depicts how the economy’s logistic function discretely shifts
up the probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit.
Shifts in expectations from news shocks can have a substantial impact. Figure 9 compares
the equilibrium path from the last section (solid lines), to the path when a news shock is
realized (dashed lines). In the period of the shock, households come to expect a lower tax rate
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Figure 7: Evolution of policy regimes. Upper branch identical to ﬁgure 2: pZ: probability
of non-stationary transfers process; pL,t: probability of ﬁscal limit; AM: active monetary
policy; PF: passive ﬁscal policy; AT: active transfers policy; PM: passive monetary policy;
AF: active ﬁscal policy; PT: passive transfers policy. Lower branch: with probability pN
news arrives that reduces the expected present value of tax revenues because the limiting
tax rate becomes τmax
low <τ max.
at the ﬁscal limit than they had previously. News also causes an immediate upward shift in
the probability attached to hitting the limit. Paths of endogenous variables shift in response
to the news. Essentially, the news pulls forward many of the eﬀects from the previous section.
A higher probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit raises inﬂation, inﬂation expectations, and the
nominal interest rate. Inﬂation rises because the economy is now closer to its ﬁscal limit and
the possibility that monetary policy will turn passive, an outcome that brings with it a burst
of inﬂation. Higher debt in the period of the shock stems from households rebalancing their
portfolios: a higher nominal rate induces households to substitute out of holding real money
balances and into debt. But lower real balances also reduce seigniorage revenues, requiring
still further sales of new debt to cover the shortfall. Because tax policy remains passive, tax
rates rise along with debt.
An interesting feature of the news shock is that it reduces agents’ beliefs about taxes in
the long run.I nﬁ g u r e9, the lower limiting tax rate is not realized, so there is no data that
would indicate why agents adjusted their behavior in response to the tax news. And because
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News shock hits in 2019
that future taxes will be lower
Figure 8: News about lower expected present value of tax revenues discretely shifts up the
probability of hitting the ﬁscal limit in year 2019.
the news pertains to long-run ﬁscal decisions, it will be diﬃcult to detect the source of the
ﬁscal crisis using conventional macroeconomic time series.
9 Concluding Remarks
As countries enter an era of ﬁscal stress, policymakers will confront the implications of that
stress, and its associated uncertainty, for inﬂation and the ability of monetary policy to
control inﬂation and aﬀect the economy in the usual ways. Debt can assume an explosive
trajectory in periods when taxes are unable to move higher for political reasons and central
banks continue to ﬁght inﬂation aggressively. Explosive debt dynamics push countries toward
their ﬁscal limits and can have powerful eﬀects on inﬂation that depend on expectations of
future monetary and ﬁscal policies. In most countries, political institutions do not anchor
ﬁscal expectations on policies that would prevent inﬂation.
Sargent and Wallace (1981) taught us that if ﬁscal policy persists in running exogenous
primary surpluses, then eventually monetary policy must submit and stabilize debt, with
the inevitable result of high inﬂation. This paper makes the remarkable point that even
if long-run policies give monetary policy perfect control over inﬂation, in the transition to
that long run, monetary policy can spectacularly lose control. Monetary policy’s control of
inﬂation may be even more fragile that Sargent and Wallace depict.


































































































Figure 9: Simulated time paths in the period before the ﬁscal limit without—solid lines—and
with—dashed lines—news about lower expected present value of tax revenues. News arrives
in 2019. Policy before the ﬁscal limit is active monetary, passive tax, and active transfers
policies.
In 2010, despite the long-term ﬁscal shortfalls that advanced economies face, expectations
of future inﬂation are stable and low. Some observers have inferred from this that ﬁscal
imbalances are not a concern for monetary policy. There is little doubt, however, that in the
absence of long-term ﬁscal reforms, many countries will hit their ﬁscal limits, so why are we
not seeing evidence that inﬂation is on the rise?
Several possibilities suggest themselves. First, as Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2011) show,
stable inﬂation expectations are not necessarily anomalous. They can arise if expectations
center on substantial entitlements reforms in the future, with little probability that mone-
tary policy will move away from targeting inﬂation aggressively. Second, with only a few
exceptions, major economies continue to operate well below their ﬁscal limits, despite the
rapid increase in debt stemming from the recession and ﬁnancial crisis. A country that is far
from its ﬁscal limit would have no reason to expect creeping inﬂation due to ﬁscal shortfalls.
Third, the simulations in Davig, Leeper, and Walker (2011) also show that even if the mean
of expected inﬂation is benign, there may be tail events in which inﬂation is quite high. A
small probability of very high inﬂation plays a critical role in the existence of the rational
expectations equilibrium.
Finally, results in previous papers that show how benign inﬂation can be consistent with
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an era of ﬁscal stress rely heavily on economic agents having clear understandings of the
possible policy adjustments and their probabilities. They also rely on shifting to policy
regimes that always stabilize government debt. This paper has explored two ways in which
such an innocuous outcome may not occur: policy authorities may not coordinate to ensure
that some stabilizing policy is always in place and news that discretely shifts agents’ views
about long-run ﬁscal prospects can trigger sudden increases in inﬂation.
The policy scenarios we have considered, in which ﬁscal stress feeds into inﬂation, are not
merely possible: they are plausible in countries in which policy institutions do not adequately
anchor expectations of ﬁscal policy.
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